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Abstract: The eclectic paradigm of Dunning (1980) (with its OLI and 
four motives for FDI framework) can be reconciled with the firm 
and country matrix of Rugman (1981). However, the fit is not perfect.  
The main reason for misalignment is that Dunning is focused upon outward 
FDI into host economies, whereas Rugman’s matrix is for firm-level strategy 
covering MNE activity in both home and host countries.
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IntroductIon
The field of international business has largely been developed over the 
last forty years through the insight and leadership of John Dunning. 
At the University of Reading he built upon the theory of internalization 
developed by his colleagues, Peter Buckley and Mark Casson (Buckley and 
Casson 1976), to develop what has become known as the eclectic para-
digm (Dunning 1980, 1981, 1988). Together, internalization theory and the 
eclectic paradigm provide the cornerstones for the current theory of the 
multinational enterprise (MNE) (Verbeke 2009). They also provide the 
intellectual foundations for the rigorous theoretical and empirical analysis 
which characterizes research on MNEs at what has become known as the 
“Reading School” of international business (Rugman 2009).
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dunnIng’s eclectIc paradIgm
The eclectic paradigm has been developed by John Dunning in a series 
of publications (Dunning 1980, 1981, 1988, 1992). There are three factors 
that determine the international activities of multinational enterprises 
(MNEs). These are ownership (O) advantages, location (L) advantages, 
and internalization (I) advantages. Thus, the Dunning eclectic paradigm is 
also known as the OLI paradigm. The OLI paradigm explains outward for-
eign direct investment (FDI). It suggests that MNEs develop competitive O 
advantages at home and then transfer these abroad to specific countries 
(depending on L advantages) through FDI, which allows the MNE to inter-
nalize the O advantages. In contrast to the eclectic paradigm, internaliza-
tion theory is mainly used to explain the choice of entry mode. For example, 
I advantages overcome the externality of knowledge as a public good, such 
that FDI is preferred to licensing, joint ventures, or alliances. (In all of the 
last three modalities, there is a risk of dissipation of the firm’s knowledge 
advantage.) Using Dunning’s own reasoning, it is apparent that there is 
a close linkage between O and I advantages in that a knowledge-type O 
advantage needs to be internalized. As will be shown below, this process 
is best analyzed by transaction cost analysis at the firm level. In contrast, L 
advantages can be fully explained by country-level analysis.
One of the problems with Dunning’s eclectic paradigm is that it is 
too eclectic. Indeed, in many ways, each of the three motives for FDI is 
overdetermined. This is especially true for O advantages. According 
to Dunning, these include not only the firm’s intangible assets, such as 
knowledge, brands, organizational structure, and management skills, but 
also natural factor endowments; manpower; capital; the cultural, legal and 
institutional environment; and industry market structure. Obviously the 
latter set of O advantages is easier to analyze as country factors. However, 
Dunning argues that such country factors can somehow be turned into 
O advantages. Going one step further, Dunning (1993) argued that O 
advantages could explain the ability of MNEs to form alliances. MNEs 
do this by taking advantage of common governance structures across 
borders, such that relational assets are created which allow firms to access 
resources controlled by partners. This is a form of business networks or 
alliance capitalism, driven by a very broad interpretation of O advantages. 
(See the Appendix for a more detailed discussion of O advantages.)
In a similar manner, Dunning has a very broad definition of location (L) 
advantages. Here it is host country L advantages that matter, including 
market size, natural resources, aspects of the infrastructure, the education 
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system, governance structures, and other aspects of political and govern-
ment activity. Given that firms can lobby governments to obtain shelter-
type O advantages, the distinction between L and O advantages is difficult 
to make. For example, when an MNE is given access to natural resources 
(ownership of an oil well, a forest, or a mine), a host country L advantage 
is transformed into an O advantage. 
Finally, I advantages are clearly strongly linked to O advantages. Indeed, 
without the institutional form of the MNE it is difficult to see how O 
advantages could exist on their own without being owned (internal-
ized) by the firm. In their essence, intangible knowledge assets are an 
example of the firm replacing the market (Williamson 1975; Buckley and 
Casson 1976; Rugman 1981; Hennart 1982). Dunning seems to argue that the 
I advantage only relates to transaction costs, such that an O advantage is 
needed to explain organizational, financial, and institutional advantages. 
This distinction between transactional ownership advantages and asset 
ownership advantages was introduced by Dunning and Rugman (1985). 
However, this paper also argued that Hymer-type advantages (1960) need-
ed to be internalized by the firm in order to explain FDI activity.
reconcIlIng the eclectIc paradIgm wIth  
InternalIzatIon theory
Internalization theory, as developed by Buckley and Casson (1976), Rug-
man (1981), and Hennart (1982), is a firm-level theory explaining why 
the MNE will exert proprietary control (ownership) over an intangible, 
knowledge-based, firm-specific advantage (FSA). In internalization 
theory, all FSAs are efficiency-based. The knowledge advantage arises 
from a transaction cost economics explanation, whereby the public good 
nature of knowledge (an externality) is remedied through the hierarchy of 
a firm overcoming this situation of market failure. The other types of FSAs, 
such as brand advantage, skills in management, and organizational capa-
bilities, are also efficiency-based and are compatible with the resource-
based view (RBV) and the value creation aspects of Penrose (Rugman and 
Verbeke 2002). In short, internalization theory applies transaction cost 
economics and the RBV to explain the efficiency aspects of MNEs. 
In contrast, the eclectic paradigm adds Hymer-type advantages (1960) 
to the efficiency-based FSAs of internalization theory. As demonstrated 
in Dunning and Rugman (1985), some Hymer advantages serve to close 
markets and provide potential rents to the MNE. These are the asset-based 
O advantages of the eclectic paradigm. They need to be distinguished from 
the transaction-based O advantages of internalization theory. The distinc-
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tion between asset-based O advantages and transaction-based O advan-
tages, introduced by Dunning in 1981, is potentially misleading to scholars 
in international business. Dunning seems to regard internalization the-
ory as only dealing with the transaction as the unit of analysis (possibly 
because it is based upon transaction cost economics), whereas Buckley 
and Casson (1976), Rugman (1981), Hennart (1982), and subsequent writ-
ings have all demonstrated that internalization theory takes the firm as 
the unit of analysis. This is why FSAs were defined in Rugman (1981) 
as the relevant advantages. The FSAs are obviously at firm level and not at 
transaction level.
Indeed, contrary to the firm-level analysis at the core of internalization 
theory, the eclectic paradigm is more of an industry-level analysis. The 
mingling of O, L, and I advantages serves to explain outward FDI and, 
although this has firm-level implications, has been mainly tested at indus-
try level (Dunning 1992). Furthermore, the extension of the eclectic theory 
to explain economic development in the investment development path 
offers industry-level analysis to explain the expansion patterns of indus-
tries and countries (Dunning and Narula 1996). The essence of the eclectic 
theory is that the O, L, and I advantages interact to produce a rich (almost 
co-evolutionary) explanation of the patterns of overseas FDI at industry 
level. In contrast, internalization theory is a firm-level explanation of FDI, 
which is able to focus upon the strategic decision-making of the MNE and 
is able to demonstrate the heterogeneity of firm-level behavior within any 
industry. 
Internalization theory also differs from the eclectic paradigm in its treat-
ment of the mode of entry. With internalization theory, the MNE can choose 
to expand abroad either through FDI (retaining knowledge-based FSAs), 
or it can choose another form of entry, such as licensing, joint ventures, 
or alliances (all of which lead to potential dissipation of the knowledge-
based FSA of the MNE). The relative costs and benefits of the choice of 
entry mode will vary over time, potentially leading the MNE to sequence 
foreign entry through FSA control mechanisms, such as exporting and 
FDI, to be followed later by more risky modes, such as alliances, joint ven-
tures, and licensing. For models of the dynamics of the choice of entry 
mode, see chapter 3 in Rugman (1981) and Buckley and Casson (1981). In 
short, internalization theory explores the hazards of doing business across 
different entry modes, where the FSAs of the MNE need to be offset 
against both dissipation risks and the liability of foreignness in entering 
into risky foreign markets (Rugman and Verbeke 2003).
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The treatment of location advantages and the choice of entry mode in the 
eclectic paradigm is much broader (and theoretically less precise) than 
in internalization theory. The eclectic paradigm examines the interactions 
between O, L, and I at industry level. In this way, it is much closer to conven-
tional international economics than is the RBV approach of internalization 
theory. For example, in the eclectic theory aspects of the L variable (such 
as ownership of natural resources or government controlled businesses) 
are transformed into O advantages. Similarly, the asset-seeking motive for 
FDI advanced by Dunning confuses the desire of a home country firm in 
seeking knowledge with the locational availability of such knowledge in a 
host country. Absent from the asset-seeking motive for FDI is any rationale 
as to why knowledge would be sold to the foreign firm. This type of confu-
sion comes from an approach which ignores the critical role of the firm in 
generating and controlling knowledge. Using the logic of internalization 
theory, it would be extremely rare for asset-seeking FDI to exist. No firm in 
the knowledge-intensive country would have an advantage in dissipating 
its knowledge-based FSA to a potential rival asset-seeking firm.
To summarize, the broad nature of the eclectic paradigm, with its focus 
on industry-level data and the comingling of O, L, and I advantages, leads 
to a more descriptive, indeed holistic, explanation of the motives of out-
ward FDI. In contrast, internalization theory has a narrower and more 
parsimonious focus upon the intangible knowledge advantages of MNEs. 
It is therefore more analytical and predictive than the eclectic paradigm. 
As a result, Rugman (1981) argued that the two key determinants of FDI 
are country-based factors, called country specific advantages (CSAs), and 
firm-level factors, called firm specific advantages (FSAs). We now turn to a 
section which relates the eclectic paradigm to this FSA/CSA framework. 
the eclectIc paradIgm and the fsa/csa framework
In a popularization of internalization theory, Rugman (1981) outlined the 
firm and country factors relevant for analysis of MNE activity. It built upon 
internalization theory to construct a matrix which brings together firm 
specific advantages (FSAs) and home country specific advantages (CSAs). 
The axes of this matrix are discussed in Rugman (1981), but the matrix 
itself was not published until work in the mid 1980s. (For a summary, see 
Rugman and Verbeke 1990, 2008). It will be noted that the FSA/CSA matrix 
has two axes, whereas there are three variables in Dunning’s eclectic para-
digm. Obviously these three variables cannot be reconciled with the FSA/
CSA matrix in a one-to-one mapping, although the location variable in 
Dunning is an exact match with the CSA axis in the Rugman matrix. Thus 
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the conceptual difficulty lies in dealing with Dunning’s O and I. For some 
time Rugman has suggested that these be combined into the FSA axis of 
his matrix (Rugman and Collinson 2006; Rugman 2009) (For an early state-
ment to this effect, see Rugman and Verbeke (1992), and for a more recent 
interpretation see Rugman and Verbeke (2008).) What is the rationale for 
incorporating Dunning’s OLI into the FSA/CSA matrix?  
First, Dunning defines location variables as those dealing with host coun-
try factors, such as the labor force, natural resources, market size, and 
other environmental factors, including culture. It is important to note that 
he also includes aspects of host country government behavior in the L vari-
able. These L variables are precisely the country factors in the CSA axis of 
the Rugman FSA/CSA matrix. However, Rugman first develops the FSA/
CSA matrix for MNEs in the home country (of course, the framework can 
also be applied to host countries simply by drawing a second matrix with 
host CSAs, or by relabeling the original matrix in this way).  In situations 
where Rugman discusses home country CSAs, there is some dissidence 
with Dunning’s L variable (which he explicitly states is for host countries). 
Overall, there is no substantive difference between Rugman and Dunning 
regarding the reconciliation of the L variable with the CSA axis.  
Second, Rugman has argued that O and I can be usefully combined and 
incorporated on the FSA axis of his matrix.  The primary reason is that 
ownership advantages are firm specific, as is the internalization process. 
In other words, the outward FDI of interest to Dunning is undertaken by 
MNEs, who are the agents to simultaneously internalize and exert propri-
etary control (ownership) over the use of scarce, firm-specific, knowledge-
based advantages.  Using a strict Coase-Williamson view of internaliza-
tion (whereby knowledge is a public good which needs to be owned and 
internalized by a firm in light of the public goods externality of knowledge 
creation), it is apparent that both O and I are central to explaining the 
knowledge FSA of an MNE.  Also, when Hymer (1960) monopoly-type 
“advantages” are being considered (such as scale, differentiation, resource 
access, distribution channels, access to financial capital, etc.), it is also 
appropriate to consider these as FSAs in which there are combinations 
of O and I advantages.  Thus, the firm (MNE) becomes the institutional 
mechanism for linking O and I on the FSA axis of the matrix.  
the fsa/csa matrIx and dunnIng’s four motIves for fdI
The conclusion is that the OLI paradigm neatly transforms into the FSA/
CSA matrix.  Further evidence of this can be provided when we consid-
er the four motives for FDI developed by Dunning (e.g., Dunning 1992; 
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Dunning and Lundan 2009).  Dunning’s four motives for FDI are as 
follows: natural resource-seeking; market-seeking; efficiency-seeking; 
and strategic asset-seeking. These can be incorporated into the FSA/CSA 
matrix, as shown in Figure 1.  
Figure 1. The Eclectic Paradigm’s Motives for FDI in the FSA/CSA Matrix
In Figure 1, cell 1 is a situation where host country CSAs matter and the 
FSAs of home country firms do not when determining outward FDI. In 
Dunning’s terms, cell 1 will contain resource-seeking FDI. The home 
country MNEs want access to host country natural resources, cheap 
labor, favorable host country government policies, etc.  Cell 1 is also where 
market-seeking FDI can be identified. Here the home country MNE needs 
access to the size and consumer base in the host country. Also important 
for market-seeking FDI is the extent and quality of host country infrastruc-
ture, supplier networks, special clusters, and supportive host government 
policies. In short, both resource-seeking FDI and market-seeking FDI are 
largely explained by the strong CSAs in cell 1.
In cell 2, there is a lack of both FSAs and CSAs, which suggests that no FDI 
will be taking place in the host country.  
In cell 3, we have asset-seeking FDI.  Here, home country MNEs (today 
mainly from emerging economies) go to a host country in the hope of 
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only half the story. While emerging economy MNEs may want to acquire 
knowledge, there is no reason to believe that firms in the host countries 
will want to sell it to them. Therefore, asset-seeking FDI is a weak form of 
FDI; it is only a partial explanation, since the completion of this strategy 
lies outside of the control of the home country firm. Frankly, the attention 
paid to asset-seeking FDI over the last twenty years is probably unjusti-
fied; it is very doubtful that much of it actually takes place. Even if home 
country firms attempt non-equity types of FDI, such as joint ventures or 
collaborative alliances, it is difficult to believe that knowledge is actual-
ly being transferred to them in a dynamic sense. For example, Lenovo’s 
acquisition of the IBM PC division, while potentially an asset-seeking FDI, 
may well not lead to future knowledge generation by Lenovo. Similarly, 
takeovers of creative service firms are unlikely to lead to ongoing knowl-
edge generation (Rugman and Doh 2008).
Cell 1 is also relevant for efficiency-seeking FDI. It is not in cell 3, which 
would require that the home country MNE have very strong FSAs 
which are related to host country CSAs. Instead, these are cost efficien-
cies, such as saving on labor costs in a foreign country, which clearly fall 
under a type of FSA based upon the CSA in cell 1. Indeed, in Dunning’s 
work on efficiency-seeking FDI, he explicitly embeds this motive as being 
dependent upon host country advantages, such as factor endowments and 
government policy. All such country effects are in cell 1.
Cell 4 cannot include any of Dunning’s four motives for FDI. The reason is 
that Dunning has developed the OLI paradigm, including the four motives 
for FDI, within the context of outward FDI directed towards host country 
locations. Therefore, in terms of Figure 1, high CSAs are required for each 
of Dunning’s four motives for FDI.  
conclusIons
The traditional FSA/CSA matrix in Rugman (1981) explains an MNE’s 
outward FDI based upon home country CSAs and FSAs. Thus it is a home 
country, outward FDI framework. In contrast, Dunning’s eclectic para-
digm uses the OLI variables to determine outward FDI on the basis of 
opportunities in host countries, i.e., host country CSAs matter. Further, 
all of Dunning’s OLI variables are analyzed from the viewpoint of the 
host country; thereby, his four motives for FDI (natural resource-seeking, 
market-seeking, efficiency-seeking, and strategic asset-seeking) all 
appear as reasons for FDI in a host economy.
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appendIx:  the end of ownershIp advantages
The tension between internalization theory and the eclectic paradigm is 
largely confined to differing views about ownership advantages. In both 
frameworks, the internalization variable is used to explain the modality of 
foreign entry. There are situations in which FDI by wholly owned subsid-
iaries (I) is preferable to licensing or joint ventures. This is the situation 
when the MNE has an intangible, knowledge-based FSA and needs to 
prevent its dissipation in foreign markets through the use of an internal 
market (Rugman 1981). Dunning (1993) basically agrees with this premise. 
Empirical research on knowledge generation and innovation within the 
MNE also broadly supports this thinking (Caves 1982, 1996; Cantwell 2001; 
Dunning 1997).
The location variable exhibits a lower degree of congruence in the inter-
nalization and eclectic frameworks. Internalization theory treats location 
as country factors, or CSAs. These are exogenous. Dunning’s view of loca-
tion is basically that of a country level economist’s theory of comparative 
advantage. He examines home and host country CSAs. However, these 
may not necessarily be exogenous to the firm, as in internalization the-
ory. The area of agreement across the two frameworks is that CSAs such 
as factor endowments (labor, natural resources, government policy, etc.) 
can be assessed. Therefore, the L variable of the eclectic paradigm relates 
relatively strongly to the home country CSA axis of internalization theory. 
Indeed, Dunning agrees with Rugman that the CSA axis can be redrawn 
to represent host country CSAs, or to represent net differentials between 
home and host country CSAs.
The key difference between internalization theory and the eclectic para-
digm occurs due to the use of ownership advantages by Dunning (1981). 
Dunning defines ownership advantages to include not only firm-level ca-
pabilities but, also, the resources and capabilities of the home country. 
Dunning explicitly states that ownership advantages include intangible, 
firm-specific assets, such as knowledge, organizational and managerial 
skills, brand names, etc.  But, he then states that O advantages also include 
home country institutional factors, such as the cultural and legal environ-
ment, and tangible assets, such as labor and natural resources. Obviously, 
such institutional and tangible assets should not be defined as O advan-
tages but as L advantages.
One conclusion to be drawn from the mistreatment of O advantages by 
Dunning (1981, 1993) is that the eclectic paradigm is inconsistent with the 
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resource-based view (RBV) of the firm. The RBV requires a focus upon 
firm-level capabilities, i.e., the FSAs of internalization theory.  The RBV 
would not regard generally available country-level attributes such as la-
bor, natural resources, and the institutional environment as firm-specific 
capabilities.
It is not surprising that the eclectic paradigm includes too many items as 
O advantages. Dunning does not have a firm-level theory of the interna-
tional firm. Instead, he is more interested in explaining patterns of FDI, 
which is a country-level approach rather than a firm-level approach. 
Indeed, Dunning et al. (2007) recently offered country-level data on FDI 
patterns to demonstrate and complement the original firm-level empirical 
evidence on regionalization by Rugman and Verbeke (2004, 2007).
This provides a clue as to the ambiguities in the eclectic paradigm. The 
empirical research in the international business field demonstrates a high 
degree of correlation between country-level outward FDI data and firm- 
level foreign sales data. But, that is not surprising, since it is MNEs (at firm 
level) that undertake the outward FDI (at country level). Indeed, the extent 
to which these two sets of data are not better correlated is probably due to 
measurement error and differences in definition, rather than to theoreti-
cal differences.
How can the eclectic paradigm be reconciled with internalization theory 
based on the logic of this paper? The simplest solution is to abandon the 
treatment of ownership advantages as a separate category in the eclectic 
paradigm. Instead, the firm-specific components of O advantages should 
be incorporated with I advantages, and the country-level O advantages 
would be better treated as L advantages.
